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Abstract—Nowadays, many companies, administrations, and
individuals are outsourcing the storage of their data to large-
scale Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). Unfortunately, the modern
cloud infrastructure virtualization results in the difficulty or the
impossibility for data owners to know the location where their
data are stored. Data location verification is required due to
legal, privacy, and performance constraints. Recently ”Where
are my data located in the Cloud?” has become a challenge and
solutions have been proposed to verify data location. Even in
case of the establishment of a strong Service-Level Agreement,
which includes an initial guarantee regarding data location, the
CSP may then move the data in another location, like another
country, in order to cut the costs or for any other reasons.
This paper considers landmark-based verification approaches,
which are flexible and low cost compared to other location
verification approaches. The objective is the identification of
vulnerabilities relating to the main proposed landmark-based
location verification approaches when malicious CSPs are in-
volved and the proposal of some countermeasures against CSP’s
attacks. We present, to the best of our knowledge, the most
comprehensive literature survey on vulnerabilities of landmark-
based data location approaches.
Keywords-Cloud computing; Data location verification;
Landmark-based approaches; Threats
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud usage is growing every day and many companies,
administrations, and individuals are outsourcing the storage
of their data to large-scale distributed storage systems. Such
users are thus relieved of the tasks related to the management
and maintenance of the equipment for storing their data. The
counterpart is that they lose some control on their data and
they have to trust their CSP. For the Cloud to be more widely
accepted, users can enforce their requirements through QoS
clauses including the data location. Data location requirements
are due to multiple aspects including legal issues [2], privacy
[15], and performance [12].
Outsourcing the storage of user’s data to the Cloud appears
as a good solution. However, data storage is often subject
to restrictions regarding the location of data. For instance,
in Europe the governments force some data to be stored
by certified companies in certified data centers [2]. The
data storage contract must specify the data location. These
restrictions also are applied in Canada [1], the USA [3],
and many other countries. For all these reasons, users would
like to be able to verify their data location. Unfortunately,
because of today’s cloud infrastructure virtualization, data
owners cannot easily know the location where their data are
stored. In addition, even in case of the establishment of a
strong Service-Level Agreement (SLA), which includes an
initial guarantee regarding data location, the CSP may then
move the data to another location, like another country, in
order to cut the costs or just by mistake.
During the SLA establishment phase, the CSP agrees on the
data location specified through location clause. Then, the users
have two alternatives: either trust the CSP or do not trust it
and deploy appropriate mechanisms to verify the data location
at any time. To consider data location verification, some
authors proposed approaches allowing users to verify data
location under given assumptions regarding the CSP behavior,
connection links between users and the CSP, and so on.
Three location verification approaches classes are commonly
distinguished:
• Cloud framework-based approaches [9], [17], [20] aim
at providing a software framework to install on the
CSP. Such a software is in charge of the data location
verification.
• Hardware-based approaches [5], [7], [16] aim at provid-
ing a tamper-proof hardware root of trust, attached to one
or several CSP’s physical machines that guarantees their
own locations, so by linking such a hardware to the data
it can guarantee data location.
• Landmark-based approaches [8], [10], [11], [12], [14],
[15], [18], [19] aim at providing communication-based
solutions to estimate data location. A landmark may be
any host connected to the Internet and whose physical
location is known. Unlike the previous approach classes,
the landmark-based approaches are not restrictive for
the CSP, as they do not require the installation of any
specific hardware or software on the CSP. The user
deploys landmarks in different known locations, trying
to surround the locations in which data are believed to
be stored. In a first step, landmarks interact with each
other to build a distance model, mainly based on the
Round-Trip Times (RTTs) between them. This step is
the training step and results in machine learning model.
Then, upon user’s location verification request, landmarks
interact with the CSP where data are assumed to be stored
to collect RTTs involving the CSP. Using the previously
built learning model and the new RTT measurements, a
geographic zone reflecting the RTTs is derived. The CSP
location should be included in the derived zone, otherwise
a malicious or accidental move of the data to another
location has occurred.
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In the sequel, we only address landmark-based approaches
for their flexibility and low cost. Shifting the data from the
valid location, which is the one of the CSP included in the
SLA, may result from an accidental or malicious behavior of
the CSP. In case of malicious CSP, the verification approaches
should consider attacks coming from the CSP to prevent them
discovering that the data have been moved elsewhere to cut
costs.
We identify the potential attacks and suggest methods to
avoid or detect them. It should be noticed that for performance
reasons, including data access delay and robustness, the data
may be stored at different locations by the CSP and the
users are aware of the distribution or duplication of their
data. In such a case, the location verification process is
designed to verify a set a locations and not a single one.
Without loss of generality, a single location is assumed in
the sequel. Iterating the verification process described in the
following sections would contribute to consider multi-location
CSPs. The objectives of the paper are the identification
of vulnerabilities relating to the most cited landmark-based
location verification approaches and the proposal of some
countermeasures to elude malicious CSP’s attacks. It is worth
noticing that the paper is limited to presentation of attack
countermeasures. Given the number of identified attacks, the
analytical modeling of the proposed countermeasures and their
simulation or experimentation are not addressed. Also, the
proposed attack identification considers the chain of functions
composing the verification process and how each function may
be manipulated by malicious CSPs. Our goal is to answer the
question “how to make the data location verification process
as much robust as possible?” and not the question “how one
can design a malicious CSPs?”
In the following sections, data location, or location in short,
means the zone in which the CSP is expected to be located.
Location verification process, or verification process in short,
means the set of actions, including data collecting, training,
and location inference performed by the participating nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the design characteristics of existing data location
verification approaches, which are the most cited in the liter-
ature. In Section III, the potential attacks on the verification
process are described and some countermeasures are proposed.
It should be noticed that—because of space reasons—only
the main ideas of the countermeasures are described. Section
IV highlights the vulnerabilities of the selected data location
verification approaches. Section V concludes the paper.
II. LANDMARK-BASED DATA LOCATION VERIFICATION
APPROACHES
Recall that a landmark may be any host connected to the
Internet and whose physical location is known to the other
landmarks and to the Verifier. The latter is a node, which
coordinates the verification process and takes the final decision
regarding data location. Landmarks collaborate to estimate
the CSP location compared to their own locations. Landmark
distribution scale refers to the area in which landmarks are
located. Such an area may be the Earth, many continents, a
single continent, a very large country, a small country, or a
part (state, region, county...) of a country. In [8], [10], [14],
[15], [19] continental scale is used, deploying landmarks in
the USA or in Europe. [11], [12], [18] use the worldwide
scale. It is worth noticing that on one hand the accuracy of
the distance and zone estimate depends on the collected data.
The more landmarks are deployed and the more measurements
are collected, the more accurate are the estimates. However,
the verification process should be kept at a reasonable cost and
the number of active landmarks, which agree to collaborate,
is limited on the other hand.
Most of location verification approaches are machine learn-
ing (ML) based. Roughly, the idea is that if one accurately
learns about the network performance regarding the zone
where the CSP is assumed to be, without CSP’s participation
in the learning, then when the CSP is probed the network per-
formance experienced should be similar to the ones observed
during learning step, otherwise the CSP should be declared
out of zone. More specifically, there are two steps in the
verification approaches:
• Training step: landmarks interact with each other to col-
lect network measurements including Round Trip Times
(RTTs), number of hops, and so on. In the sequel, unless
stated otherwise, ”network measurements” mean RTT
values. Then, measurements are used to compute the
parameters of a ML model, which is used in the second
step to the estimate a geographic zone associated with
the CSP.
• Verification step: when the user needs to verify the CSP
location, landmarks are notified and then they interact
(sending Ping requests or accessing the data stored on
the CSP) with the CSP to collect RTT measurements
involving the CSP. The new measurements and the ML
model established in the training step are used to derive
a zone in which the CSP is estimated to be located.
The main building blocks of location verification approaches
are shown on Figure 1 and described in the sequel. Existing
approaches, which are summarized in Table I, differ on how
the building blocks are designed and deployed.
A. Measurement Collecting
Measurement collecting is the distinctive feature of
landmark-based approaches compared to the other location
guaranteeing approaches. As previously mentioned, measure-
ments are collected to fit machine learning models. Proposed
solutions differ according to the network metrics and how they
measure them.
Different metrics may be used to determine the CSP’s
location. The most used metrics are relating to the RTT and
include raw RTT values, the mean, the mode, the median,
and the standard deviation of RTT. Hop count may also be
used to enforce the accuracy of the learning model [10].
Mainly, measurements are achieved through Traceroute or
Ping requests or using data accesses based on HTTP. The first
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Fig. 1. Building bloclcs of location verification approaches (the arrows show different ways in combining the building blocks) 
scheme the overhead and its variation, when the data are really 
accessed on disks, raises more variance in the observed RTis. 
It is worth noticing that the second scheme is useful when 
the verification process collects RTI during data accesses by 
applications, which minimizes the communication cost of the 
verification process, and also when the prober wants to check 
that the data are really on the responding server (see Attacks 
in section III). Traceroute or Ping messages are used in [10], 
[12]. H1TP messages are used in [8], [l l], [14], [19]. Both 
message types are used in [15]. 
B. Distance Estimate
Once network-related metrics are collected, decentralized
learning-based approaches use them to infer a distance be­
tween each probing landmark and the CSP location. Roughly, 
the distance estimate is a function f that takes measurements 
M as input and returns a distance d: d = f(M). 
There are several ways to select f function: linear regression 
[8], (19], polynomial regression [Il], delay to distance ratio 
[15], and bestline [12], [14]. lt is worth noticing that each of 
the above options to select the estimate function bas its pros 
and cons from the statistical analysis point view. 
Depending on landmark training of the solution under 
consideration, a single distance estimate function is built by 
the Verifier using alJ the collected data or each landmark builds 
its distance estimate function using its own collected data 
and then sends its estimated distance to the Verifier. The first 
scheme is called centralized distance estimate and the second 
decentralized distance estimate. Decentralized distance esti­
mate functions are proposed in [8], [l l], [18] and centralized 
local ones in the other solutions except for [10] that does not 
include any distance estimate function. As far as we know, the 
distance estimate functions built locally by landmarks cliffer 
only in their parameters and not in their forms, i.e. alJ the 
distance estimate functions used by Iandmarks may be linear, 
polynomial and so on, but without mix. 
C. Location Inference
The Verifier performs the last task, which is the inference
of the CSP zone based on learning step and measurements 
involving the CSP. The inference of the zone depends on the 
learning coordination: 
• Location inference in centralized learning-based ap­
proaches: mainly, classification is used in these ap­
proaches. Inter-landmark measurements are used by the
Verifier to fit a classifier; it is the learning step. Then,
measurements between landmarks and the CSP are used
to predict the CSP location zone. Different types of ML
classification may be used: Naive Bayes, Instance-based
learning, and Hierarchical clustering.
• Location inference in decentralized learning-based ap­
proaches: multilateration is used in these approaches.
Recall that prior to this final step, landmarks sent their
distance estimates. Let n be the number of active land­
marks, (xi , Yi) the coordinates of landmark i, and di 
the estimated distance between landmark i and the CSP.
A circle, with (xi, Yi) as center and di as radius, is
associated with landmark i. Multilateration is the function
whicb takes as input a set of n circles and returns the
zone, which is a polygon with a maximum of n sides,
formed by the intersection of those circles. Theo, the
interpretation of the yielded zone may result in a city,
a country, a continent, etc.
Among the analyzed solutions, the ones proposed in [8], 
[10], [18] use classification and the others use multilateration. 
D. Proof of Data Possession protocol (PDP) Utilization
PDP protocol is a protocol that allows data owner to verify
that data are actually stored on the data server. lt consists of 
four main operations: data pre-processing, inquiry, response, 
and check. There are two main design schemes for PDP 
protocols: 
• Message authentication code (MAC) based scbeme: the
data owner pre-processes the data, generating a tag for
each data block using a bash function. Theo, the tags
are stored on the data owner and the data blocks sent
to the data server to be stored. When the data owner
needs to verify that the data server bas the data, it sends
a PDP inquiry including a list of randomly selected
block numbers. The data server reads and sends the
requested data blocks. Theo, the data owner computes
the tags for the received data blocks and compares them
to the tags initially Jocally-stored to confirm or not the
possession proof. lt is worth noticing that MAC-based
PDP is bandwidth consuming, depending on the number
TABLE I
MAIN DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTING LANDMARK-BASED LOCATION VERIFICATION APPROACHES
Landmark selection PDP algorithm Machine learningTraining coordination Distance estimate Location inference
Biswal2014 [10] None 1 None Centralized None2 Naive Bayes Classification
Ries2011 [18] None 1 None Centralized Virtual network coordinates Instance-Based Classification
Fotouhi2015 [12] Pre-verification None Decentralized Bestline Multilateration
Jaiswal2015 [15] Pre-verification None Decentralized Distance to delay ratio Multilateration
Benson2011 [8] None 1 None Centralized Linear regression Hierarchical clustering
Gondree2013 [14] None 1 MAC-based Decentralized Bestline Multilateration
Watson2012 [19] None 1 MAC-based Decentralized Linear regression Multilateration
Eskandari2014 [11] Pre-training None Centralized Polynomial regression Multilateration
1: All landmarks in the initial set are used in the whole verification process.
2: The classifier returns a location rather than a distance.
of blocks included in proof inquiries and the frequency
of these inquiries. MAC-based scheme is used in [14],
[19].
• Cryptography-based scheme: to avoid bandwidth con-
sumption incurred by the previous scheme, one of the
well-known solutions has been proposed in [6], which
may be summarized as follows:
– the data owner generates a private key and a public
key. Then, it associates a tag with each data block—
the tag calculation is based on the private key—and
it sends the data file and the tags to the server.
– When the data owner needs to check the data server,
it sends a PDP request including the public key
and a challenge composed of a list of data block
numbers randomly selected and a random value.
Using random block numbers and the random value
prevents the server from anticipating which blocks
will be queried in each challenge, and also prevents
it from storing combinations of the original blocks
instead of the original file blocks themselves.
– Then, the data server access the requested data
blocks and uses the public key to generate a proof of
possession composed of a tag and a hash from the
random value.
– The data owner receives the possession proof. Then,
it uses its private key to conclude whether the pos-
session proof is valid or not.
As shown on Table I, reviewed approaches don’t use
cryptographic-based PDP. We do recommend such a PDP
scheme instead of MAC-based one as it is more robust
and less resource consuming.
III. POTENTIAL ATTACKS ON THE VERIFICATION PROCESS
In order to tamper with the landmark-based verification, a
malicious CSP may implement different attacks depending on
the verification approach. The goal of these attacks is to hide
the real data location. In such a case, the CSP is considered as
being malicious and it deliberately implements specific attacks.
It is assumed that data off-shoring is made to cut costs, the
CSP is economically rational: it would take some risks by
moving data to an unauthorized location, but it does so only
if the storage cost is significantly reduced. The main types of
attacks regarding landmark-based location verification process
are summarized in Figure 2 and presented below. Some attacks
may be avoided by design; for example attacks on virtual
machine may be avoided when the user does not deploy any
VM in the verification process. Some other attacks may only
be detected; for example, the detection of RTT manipulation.
Finally, some complex attacks require more investigation to be
faced. Vulnerabilities of analyzed approaches are summarized
in Table III.
A. Blocking Verification
1) Attack principle: This basic attack is to prevent the ver-
ification process to complete; it is a type of denial-of-service.
In this attack, access to the CSP’s resources is blocked for the
verification process. There are two parts of the verification
process that can be blocked by the CSP:
• Landmark Blacklisting: the CSP detects landmarks par-
ticipating in the verification process and blacklists them
because they are potential witnesses of the malicious
CSP behavior. By preventing landmarks to collect RTT
measurements, the verification process is blocked.
• Trace service blocking: the most common way to measure
the RTT is to use ICMP (Internet Control Message
Protocol) queries such as Traceroute and Ping queries.
Under the pretext of security or performance reasons,
the CSP may decide to block ICMP queries. Any other
protocol that is not the one enabled by the CSP to access
data may also be blocked.
2) Solutions: There are different solutions for this type of
attack depending on what is blocked:
• Landmark blacklisting: there are three main solutions to
avoid landmark blacklisting. The first is that the user
and the CSP agree on a list of landmarks that will be
used to verify data location. In such a case, the CSP is
aware of the existence of the location verification and
should avoid the data off-shoring; the user is saying to
CSP ”I am watching you”. The second one, which is
used when the user wants to keep the location verification
secret, is to activate multiple legitimate machines, which
are authorized to access the data on the CSP, and then
collect the RTT values. The third solution is to randomly
select, at each training initialization time, some landmarks
Malicious CSP attacks 
Blocking verification Using malicious proxy Virtual machine misappropriation Caching data Forging RTT 
Concealed high speed 
connections 
Fig. 2 Potential attacks on the location verification process 
among a very large set of sites making it either infeasible 
or very costly for the CSP to blacklist ail those sites. 
• Trace service blocking: to overcome trace service block­
ing, the user and some landmarks may collect RIT values
while accessing the data stored on the CSP. lt is assumed
here that the CSP cannot learn about the objectives of
data accesses (i.e., when the user is really exploiting data
or wben the data access is just an alibi to derive RIT
values).
B. Using Malicious Proxy
1) Attack principle: The CSP installs a proxy located at the
data location included in the SLA, wbicb is a valid location for 
the user, and stores the data at another location. Tuen, probing 
and data access queries are answered by the proxy, thus 
persuading the user that the data are in the right location. This 
attack is implemented differently depending on the interactions 
between the location verification process and the data access 
process: 
• Without interaction: the verifier does not rely on the data
access to verify the location. In sucb a case, the verifica­
tion process only considers network-related metrics and
the proxy only needs to reply to ICMP queries instead of
the CSP. After a wave of RTI collecting wbat is estimated
by the verification process is the proxy location, wbicb is
interpreted as valid location by the verifier resulting in a
false positive. Later, when an access to data is requested,
the query is transmitted by the proxy to the real data
location site, wbicb sends the requested data to the proxy,
and then the proxy sends the data to the requesting node.
• With interaction: in tbis case, the verification process
collects the RTis while accessing data. Thus, the proxy
cannot maliciously behave as previously unless it de­
ploys data caching or special bigb-speed connections,
wbicb are other attack types presented later. Assurning no
data caching and no special connection, the proxy may
deploy attacks on the verification process if it is able
to learn about data accesses and to classify them into
two categories: i) data accesses used only for location
verification process and the content of read data is not
relevant, only RITs matter, and ü) data accesses where
the data content is relevant but no RITs are collected.
Under the assumption sucb a learning is feasible, wben
a data request is received, the proxy needs to classify it
as request type i or ii. Wben the request is classified as
type i, the proxy forges a random data and sends it to the
user and wben it is classified as type ii, a remote access
to the site of data storage is made to receive authentic
data, wbich are then sent to the user. Consequently, the 
verification decision results in a false positive. lt is worth 
noticing that this attack is potentially feasible only when 
the proxy is aware of the verification process details 
and the data accesses match specific patterns (e.g., the 
verification process is run eacb Monday between 08:00 
a.m and Il :00 a.m). 
2) Solutions: Potential solutions to face tbis attack type are
as folJows: 
• No interaction between the Verifier and Data access
processes: a Proof of Data Possession (PDP) sbould be
deployed to bave guarantees that the data are located on 
the responding proxy.
• With interaction: the first solution is to deploy a PDP
as in the previous case. The second is to make the CSP
unable to learn the objectives of data accesses to detect
those accesses used only to colJect RIT measurements
and those wbere the data matter for user's appUcations.
This may be acbieved by an appropriate sequencing of
data queries.
C. Virtual Machine Misappropriation
1) Attack principle: In the cloud context, the data of users
are stored on the CSP and also user's programs may run on 
virtual machines (VM) on the CSP. In sucb a case, both data 
and location verifier are on the CSP. lt is worth noting that the 
user may cboose to bost, on the same CSP, totally or partially 
the tasks composing the verification process. However, wben 
the CSP is malicious, it may force location verification tasks 
on its bosted VM not to send the valid data to derive the current 
data location wben the CSP has cbanged the data location. The 
VM may also be moved by malicious CSPs. 
2) Solution: To avoid VM misappropriation by a malicious
CSP, the simplest way is not to use VM to implement 
the location verifier. Rather, the location verifier sbould be 
hosted by the own user's machine or by a trusted tbird party. 
However, if for any good reasons regarding user's preferences 
or requirements, the location verifier is hosted by the CSP, the 
user must deploy on the CSP a trusted hardware, sucb as a 
Trusted Platform Module, to prevent the CSP manipulate the 
bosted VMs [4]. 
D. Forging RIT
1) Attack principle: RIT forgery is one of the basic attacks
that may be used by a malicious CSP to obfuscate the 
landmark-based location verification approacbes. When the 
location verifier tries to collect RIT values to derive the 
location of the CSP, it sends requests (Traceroute, Ping or 
data access requests) to the CSP. Then, the latter delays or
handles the request with a higher priority—which results in
lower RTT values—its responses so that the collected RTT
values either will not help the verifier to derive the current CSP
location or worst the verifier derives the agreed data location
(i.e., the location included in the SLA). It is worth noticing
that decreasing RTT based attacks are much more complex
than the ones that randomly increase the RTT. Two types of
RTT forgery may be used by the CSP:
• Random RTT forgery: the amount of waiting time upon
reception of a Ping or data request, in order to in-
crease/decrease the RTT, is randomly generated. This
causes the RTT to appear totally uncorrelated to the
distance between the landmarks and the CSP and the
verification process fails to conclude.
• Requester-location-aware RTT forgery: assuming the CSP
has a certain knowledge on the verification approach and
the locations and roles of landmarks, the waiting time to
increase/decrease the RTT is forged depending on the
origin of the query (i.e., the landmark originating the
request), so that the data appears to be stored at the
location included in SLA and not in the current CSP
location. By forging the RTT values, the centroid of
the zone where data are assumed to be is deliberately
changed. Using this process, the CSP may move the
centroid where it wants.
2) Solutions: RTT forgery attacks can be detected or
avoided depending on how RTTs are forged:
• Random RTT forgery: it might be reasonably assumed
that the CSP would increase/decrease the RTT only for
verification queries, otherwise the CSP outgoing traffic
will be impacted resulting in QoS degradation. Under
this observation, the verifier may detect RTT forgery by
comparing the RTT values received by a set of selected
landmarks around the CSP. Thus, RTT forgery detection
may be implemented using cooperative RTT measure-
ments and statistical learning on RTT samples to detect
the forged random part of RTT computed at different
landmarks. Another way to detect RTT forgery is when
the zone inferred from the forged RTT measurements is
too large [13].
• Requester-location-aware RTT forgery: this attack as-
sumes the CPS is aware of landmarks’ roles and positions
and how the RTT values are used in the verification
process to forge. To avoid this attack, a solution is to
randomly select, at each training step initialization time,
landmarks among a very large set of sites, which makes
it either infeasible or very costly for the CSP to learn and
deploy an RTT forgery for each participating landmark.
E. Caching Data
1) Attack principle: This attack may be used to obfuscate
the deployment of a PDP (Proof of Data Possession) check
proposed to face a malicious proxy (III.B). In caching data
attack, the CSP stores most of the data at a remote location
while storing in its local cache the data needed by the verifica-
tion process. When a data access request is for verification, the
CSP fetches the data in its local cache. Otherwise, the request
is forwarded to the remote site of data storage before sending
the response to the user. This attack is feasible only under the
assumption that the CSP is able learn which parts of the data
are used in the verification process in order to cache them and
which parts are used by the conventional applications of the
user in order to store them in another location. It should be
noticed that the data caching attack is different from the ”With
interaction” attack of a malicious proxy. In the latter, the data
used in the location verification are not relevant to the user so
the proxy generates any data to answer the request, while in
the caching attack the data are used both by the verification
process and by the conventional user’s applications.
2) Solutions: There are two options to face this attack:
• Avoidance by design: to make the CSP unable (at a
reasonable cost) to discover which parts of the data
are used in location verification, the verification process
should associate an RTT with each data access request
(whatever the use of data) and then use all RTTs to derive
the data location or randomly select the data to be used
in the verification process.
• Detection: under the assumption that RTTs collected
for the cached data and the other data are different—
because when the CSP moves the data it would result
in an increase of the RTT—, the verifier may check the
variability of RTT between the two sets of data and detect
a potential attack.
F. Concealed High-Speed Connections
1) Attack principle: The CSP is aware of the user’s behav-
ior, which shows that the user relies on RTT measured during
data access to derive CSP location. The CSP chooses a site
at location L, using an appropriate high-speed network, such
that the delay transfer between the CSP and the chosen site
is negligible compared to the variation of RTT between the
CSP and the user. The CSP stores the data at the location L.
Then, when the user sends data access requests to CSP, the
latter reads the data from location L and then forwards them
to the user. It is worth noticing that this attack may also be
used by a malicious proxy even though a PDP is deployed
(see Malicious proxy attack).
2) Solutions: This attack is too much elaborated as it is
based on dedicated communication infrastructure. No simple
solution may be suggested for such an attack without a third
party to certify that the CSP does not use hidden connections.
However, it can be noticed that the distance between any
locations is limited by the delay induced by the network
connection. Even with a private connection, the speed is
limited to 23c, with c the speed of light in vacuum. Considering
this limit and the necessary round-trip for the request between
two sites, moving the data of 1000 km would result in 10 ms






• Include in the SLA the list of authorized landmarks
• Collect RTT by multiple machines authorized to access the data
• Randomly select landmarks among a very large set
Trace service blocking • Collect RTT values while accessing data
Malicious proxy • Use a Proof of Data Possession Protocol• Make the CSP unable to discover the objectives of data accesses
Virtual machine misappropriation • Do not use VM to implement the whole location verification process• Deploy on the CSP a trusted hardware to protect the VM
Random RTT forgery • Deploy a cooperative scheme to detect suspicious RTT variation• Use the size of the derived location zone to detect RTT forgery
Requester-location-aware RTT forgery • Randomly select from a very large set of sites, at each training stepinitialization time, landmarks to participate
Caching data
• Use all the data accesses to collect RTT values
• Choose randomly a subset of the RTTs associated with all data accesses
• Detect RTT variation between cached data and non-cached data.
Concealed high-speed connections • Use a trusted third party to check the links used by the CSP• Use the size of the derived location zone to detect concealed high speed connections
The identified CSP’s attacks and the proposed countermea-
sures are summarized in Table II.
IV. VULNERABILITIES OF EXISTING APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES
A. Vulnerabilities of Existing Approaches
In Section II, the main design features of the existing
landmark-based location approaches are described. In this
section, their vulnerabilities regarding the attacks identified
in Section III are summarized. Table III clearly shows that
almost all the proposed location verification approaches are
far from being robust to thwart the attacks of malicious CSPs.
Consequently, these location verification approaches have to
be strengthened with appropriate countermeasures.
B. Challenges
1) Landmark Selection: Robustness and accuracy of loca-
tion verification approaches rely on the collaboration of land-
marks. However, the set of landmarks to be used in the location
verification process has not been adequately considered in
literature. At least three issues should be investigated:
• How to select—at a given cost—a set of landmarks to
reach a given accuracy of the CSP location size at a given
probability? And how the number of landmarks impact
the security of the location verification process?
• How to randomly select landmarks to participate in each
location verification wave to make the malicious CSP
unable to prepare its attacks?
• How to avoid the selection of malicious landmarks and
how to detect their misbehaving after being selected?
2) Statistical Learning on RTT Forgery: RTT measure-
ments play a paramount role in landmark-based location
verification approaches. RTT values are known to be variable
in nature when the Internet is of concern, which makes the
detection of RTT forgery a (very) complex task. One challenge
is the elaboration of statistical learning models enabling the
detection of RTT forgery and the performance analysis of such
learning models to provide (statistical) guarantees to users
regarding the CSP misbehaving detection.
3) Statistical Location Verification Guaranteeing: As men-
tioned previously, location verification methods are machine
learning based. So their result, i.e. the derived location zone,
comes with some statistical error due to the learning even
when the CSP is truthful. Assuming malicious CSPs makes
the error worse. Another challenge is the statistical analysis
of the impact of the proposed countermeasures on the success
of the location verification. In other words, given some attack
scenarios and RTT variability (in normal conditions), what are
the location zone and its accuracy and the level of confidence
in the CSP?
4) Proof of CSP Misbehaving: Prior to the user’s data
transfer on the CSP, a SLA is agreed between the partners
stating that the data will be stored at the location included
in the SLA. In case the verification process concludes—with
some probability—that either the current data location is not
valid or the CSP has deployed attacks against the location
verification process, how to report on this event? Then, how
to reveal the location verification report proving that a CSP
misbehavior has occurred? How the user can complain and
prove that the CSP is malicious?
V. CONCLUSION
Data storage on the Cloud became one of the main services
available to users via the Internet. Unfortunately, the other side
of the coin of the facilities provided by cloud service providers
is that users are losing some control on their data. In particular,
data location on the Cloud is one of the primary concerns for
Cloud users. Multiple solutions have been proposed to verify
data location. This paper presents the location verification
building blocks and compares the existing approaches. It also
identifies the potential threats on the location verification
TABLE III
VULNERABILITIES TO ATTACKS OF ANALYZED APPROACHES
Blocking verification Malicious proxy VM misappropriation Forging RTT Caching data Concealed connection
Biswal2014 [10] × × (2) × × ×
Ries2011 [18] × × (2) × × ×
Fotouhi2015 [12] × × (2) × × × ×
Jaiswal2015 [15] × (1) × (3) × × ×
Benson2011 [8] × (1) × (3) × × ×
Gondree2013 [14] × (1) × ×
Watson2012 [19] × (1) × ×
Eskandari2014 [11] × × × ×
×: the proposed solution is vulnerable to the attack; an empty case means no vulnerability.
(1): Vulnerability to landmark blacklisting.
(2): Vulnerability to malicious proxy without data access.
(3): Vulnerability to malicious proxy with data access.
process in case a malicious CSP might implement attacks to
jeopardize the location verification process. Malicious CSPs
relocate data on low cost servers, which are not authorized by
the users, and then try to make the users believe their data
are on the location agreed in the SLA. We briefly describe
some solutions to overcome the attacks or detect them and
summarize the vulnerabilities of existing location verification
approaches. We believe that integrating the proposed counter-
measures in the existing approaches would make them more
robust and consequently increase the trust level of users in
the data storage services. Finally, we identify some challenges
that require further investigation in the future. Data location
verification still remains an open and exciting issue in the
Cloud computing research field.
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